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Abstract. The popularity of video streaming in the Internet has continuously
increased and traffic generated by such applications has become a large portion
of the Internet traffic. The Peer-to-Peer (P2P) approach is becoming popular
due to better scalability and reduced distribution cost. Live streaming and Vid-
eo-on-Demand (VoD) are two fields of video streaming which have been treat-
ed as completely different; they are, however, from a user’s point of view, very
similar. Users of a P2P system already successfully collaborate on distributing
video streams, thus, allowing for an integrated collaboration by having peers
store video streams watched in the past to enable their distribution in the future.
Since key P2P properties, such as scalability and cost savings, depend on the ef-
fectiveness of the underlying incentive mechanism, this paper (1) proposes re-
port and reciprocity-based incentive mechanisms as candidates to address the
proposed scenario and (2) outlines major requirements.
1 Introduction
In the context of video streaming, live streaming and Video-on-Demand (VoD) are
differentiated; while the former provides the delivery of video streams of live events,
such as sport events, music concerts, and breaking news, the latter provides the distri-
bution of recorded content, such as movies. While different in technical nature and in
terms of implementation, from a user’s point of view they are very similar. Since us-
ers of a P2P system already successfully collaborate on distributing video streams, the
new idea of LiveShift [3] is to allow for an integrated collaboration by storing those
video streams that users have watched in the past in order to enable these users to dis-
tribute them in the future. With the combination of live and on-demand video stream-
ing users will be able to, without having previously prepared any local recording,
watch the match or the Olympics from the start and jump over uninteresting parts un-
til he/she seamlessly catches up with the live stream. Similarly, the live transmission
may be used for the premier of a movie or TV show, when it is expected that several
people watch at the same time. Instantly and automatically it will be available —
since the starting time of the premier — to every user who joins at a later time. Major
advantages for broadcasters are less administration efforts in recording and distribut-
ing video streams, since it is done automatically, and bandwidth and storage savings
occur.
To address scalability problems of client-server solutions, to reduce financial
costs, making video streaming distribution feasible for small content providers, P2P-
based video streaming solutions have appeared. However, the presence of free-riders
— peers that do not contribute resources to the network — undermines the potential
scalability and cost-savings of the P2P approaches. Incentive mechanisms have been
proposed to address this fairness problem by motivating peers to contribute resources
and act fairly towards other peers. Up to now no fully integrated incentive mecha-
nisms exists especially addressing this combination. A peer that has recorded video
streams needs an incentive to keep the copy and provide it to other peers without nec-
essarily being simultaneously interested in streams it can return to the P2P communi-
ty. Thus, report-based and reciprocity-based incentive mechanisms are excellent can-
didates to address such a scenario. Current approaches for this integrated video
streaming, however, fail to produce acceptable results, since they either require sym-
metry of interest [2], reciprocation [1], [2], or are prone to false reports [4].
2 Related Work
The key aspect in an open P2P system is the presence of an effective and secure
incentive mechanism to incentivize peers to share their resources, such as upstream
bandwidth. Closed P2P systems, e.g. SopCast [5], do not need to provide incentives
for peers to share, since protocol and source code are closed and protected by license
agreements, which force users to share their processor and bandwidth.
In reciprocity-based incentive mechanisms, peers maintain histories of past trans-
actions with other peers and use this information to decide which peers to share their
resources. These schemes can be based on direct or indirect reciprocity. In direct-reci-
procity incentive mechanisms such as Tit-for-Tat (TFT) [2], a peer bases its decision
solely on its own past experiences with other peers, rewarding peers which have con-
tributed the most. TFT does not perform well in live video streaming, since the infor-
mation is likely to flow in one direction only when a peer providing the stream is
ahead of the peer receiving it, nor in VoD, since it requires that each peers be interest-
ed in something the other has. In indirect-reciprocity incentive mechanisms, the deci-
sion of a peer A about which a peer B to provide with resources also depends on the
service that B has provided to other peers in the system. A transitive TFT mechanism
can be used, typically using a shared history. CompactPSH [1] combines both ap-
proaches, TFT and transitive TFT, to exploit indirect reciprocity using both private
and shared history, using MaxFlow to mitigate false reports. Although shown to be
more effective than TFT in a P2P file-sharing scenario, CompactPSH has not yet been
applied to P2P live or on-demand video streaming.
Report-based incentive mechanisms, such as Give-to-Get (GTG) [4], offer a tran-
sitive reputation score, letting peers favor uploading to peers which have uploaded
more to third peers. They do not expect reciprocity, which is desirable in both P2P
live video streaming and VoD, since the information flows mostly in one direction.
Yet, it relies on truthful reports from peers, a fact that hampers its real-life deploy-
ment. The missing property are guarantees offered by reciprocity-based mechanisms.
3 Proposed Approach
The approach investigated will comprise three incentive mechanisms: (a) an indirect-
reciprocity incentive mechanism, which will be refined and applied to both live and
on-demand P2P video streaming; (b) a report-based incentive mechanism, which ex-
tends the work in the area of being Sybil-resistant, based on random sampling and
P2P auditing methods, and (c) a combination of the two, which will determine a bal-
anced compromise between reciprocity- and report-based incentive mechanisms.
Indirect-reciprocity incentive mechanisms have properties, which address asym-
metry of interest; the case when a peer provides stored content and is not interested in
any content the requesting peer has to offer and when a user switches channels. It has
been applied to P2P file-sharing systems [1], showing improvement in download
times, while offering protection against false reports, which is inherent from reciproc-
ity-based incentive mechanisms. The first step is to adapt CompactPSH [1] to a P2P
video streaming scenario, creating a new incentive scheme VideoPSH. In file shar-
ing, peers exchange chunks of files in any order, and a chunk will remain interesting
to other peers for a long time. In P2P live streaming, the download rate has an upper
bound dictated by the bitrate of the video stream, and a lower bound dictated by the
loss tolerated by the video codec used, and chunks get obsolete as they lose their live-
ness. In VoD, chunks remain interesting for a longer time, and download rate may be
faster than the bitrate of the video stream. The new approach will examine its effects
on (1) QoE (Quality-of-Experience) metrics, (2) understanding and improving its
scalability, (3) Sybil- and collusion-proofness properties in the given scenario.
A fundamental problem of reciprocity-based incentive mechanisms is that it is im-
possible for the peercaster to use them, since they do not download. Also, it is diffi-
cult to transfer reputations for more than one hop, due to information becoming out-
dated and scalability issues. Hence, a new report-based incentive mechanism
(NRBIM) will be developed and evaluated. The mechanism is inspired by multi-level
marketing schemes, such as AmWay. It will function on the base that each peer is giv-
en a score, which takes into consideration the recursive contribution of each peer to
the entire P2P network; therefore, in order to increase their own score, peers need to
upload to peers with high score. A higher score improves the chance of getting close
to the peercaster, be more reliable, and experience shorter delay when watching at or
near live streaming. Scores will be calculated using a Sybil-resistant system, which
penalizes peers that are suspects of being Sybils. Finally, a distributed auditing sys-
tem will verify peers claims for their score. Such an incentive mechanism is expected
to produce good results with regard to scalability and fairness, while offering a proved
resistance to malicious peers that lie about their or other peers contribution, collude,
or create Sybils. The approach will investigate trade-offs between chance or frequen-
cy of the auditing and return achieved by malicious peers. The development of such
an incentive mechanism does represent a new contribution to the area of report-based
incentive mechanisms.
Finally, this approach proposes the investigation of the combination of both ap-
proaches to complement advantages and limitations of both. The main advantage of
reciprocity-based incentive mechanisms, like VideoPSH, is that they use reciprocity
to prevent overspending of resources, increase fairness and avoid collusion. In the
NRBIM proposed, peers may achieve partial success when cheating, but they will
have a clear chance of getting caught as well, which will be a trade-off between the
frequency of the sampling scheme used for auditing. If contributions can be verified
partially by reciprocation, the success of cheating peers is expected to be lower.
Likewise, the possible disadvantage of VideoPSH concerning its limited view,
since only reputation transfer of one hop is currently feasible in CompactPSH, can be
overcome by using verifiable reports, as in NRBIM. Another difference between
NRBIM and CompactPSH refers to the durability of the information. CompactPSH
allows reputation information to be retained for later use, if it is assumed that peer
identities are durable, while NRBIM uses only instant information to evaluate the
contribution of peers. The use case studied will profit from reputation information that
is durable, since peers must be incentivized to store and provide chunks to other peers
and be reciprocated eventually. The resulting incentive mechanism will be resistant to
Sybil attacks and collusion up to a proven point.
4 Summary
The development of incentive mechanisms suitable for an integrated live streaming
and VoD scenario is challenging. Thus, this paper proposes three possible mecha-
nisms tackling the fairness problem using different paradigms. While the first two in-
centive mechanisms will represent a contribution in their own, the third one is
planned to complement their characteristics in an integrated approach.
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